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INTRODUCTION:  DREAMING ABOUT
ARBITRATION REFORM
Jean R. Sternlight*
Some peoples’ dreams are really great, or at least really exotic.  Reverend
Martin Luther King had a history-changing dream, of the end of discrimina-
tion.1  Me, I had a dream about a really great conference on arbitration, and
how it might ultimately help lead to legal reform of arbitration.  While the
dream may not have been the most exotic, thanks to the participants in this
Symposium, and many others,2 at least the first part of my dream has come
true.  We did host a very good conference.  Perhaps this Symposium issue will
even impact the nature of the law on arbitration in this country.
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is now eighty-two years old.3  Thus,
its age, alone, raises the question as to whether the statute is in need of reform.
Beyond such ageism, the Act of late has become quite controversial.  Originally
adopted to allow businesses to knowingly choose a potentially quicker,
cheaper, more expert arbitration process over litigation,4 for many years the
Act initially received little criticism or even attention.  However, a series of
Supreme Court decisions commencing in the mid-1980s made clear that the
Act could be used not only in business-to-business settings, but also in contexts
involving disputes between a business and a “little guy” consumer, employee,
or franchisee.5  When companies began to rely on these Supreme Court deci-
sions to mandate that “little guys” resolve future disputes through private arbi-
* Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law & Director Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  I am grateful to Koa
Perlac for his research assistance on this introduction.
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial (Aug.
28, 1963) (transcript and audio recording available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/
speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm).
2 I owe special thanks to the following for helping make my dream a reality:  Michael and
Sonja Saltman, the inspirational founders and funders of the Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution; Dick Morgan and Joan Howarth, former dean and associate dean of the Boyd
School of Law, who supported this event; Ray Patterson, Associate Director of the Saltman
Center, who provided seemingly endless logistical direction and support; Mary Guidera,
staff to the Center, who made sure people got registered and/or paid; and Paula Gregory,
who pitched in at the last moment to make sure that people got where they needed to go.  I
am also very grateful to members of the Nevada Law Journal for their hard work in support-
ing the publication of these articles.
3 The Federal Arbitration Act, originally known as the U.S. Arbitration Act, was enacted in
1925.  Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (current version at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (2000)).
4 For the early history of the Act see, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Pan-
acea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
5 For a tracing of this history, see Sternlight, supra note 4, at 644-74.
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tration rather than litigation, many commentators and even some courts
condemned the practice and, at least indirectly, the FAA for permitting the
practice.6  Of course, the Court’s decisions permitting mandatory arbitration
also have their defenders,7 which is what makes for a controversy.
Apart from the disputes over mandatory arbitration, other aspects of the
Federal Arbitration Act have recently engendered increased controversy as
well.  Whereas it once was assumed that disputants who chose arbitration
would prefer a quick, inexpensive, informal, and private process, today some
disputants and some commentators are seeking to create more complex hybrids
between traditional arbitration and litigation.8  For example, some disputants
have written clauses seeking to replace the very limited review mechanisms,
described in the FAA, with a far more extensive appellate process.9  Also, the
seemingly arcane question of whether arbitrators or courts should make certain
arbitration-related decisions has recently received a great deal of attention from
both courts and commentators.10  The existence of mandatory arbitration has a
substantial impact on discussion of these issues as well, in that the nature of
appellate review and division of jurisdictional powers can affect both the extent
and impact of mandatory arbitration.11
6 For some of the best and certainly most colorful critiques of mandatory arbitration, see
Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1999) (“The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights
and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance
policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming
to the body politic.”); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (“[T]he arbitration law made by the Court is a shanty-
town.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36
(stating, referring to arbitration jurisprudence, “[t]he Supreme Court has created a monster”).
7 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251,
261 (2006).
8 See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999).
9 For discussion of this issue, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, Pro-
cess Purity and Innovation:  A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, & Drahozal, 8 NEV.
L.J. 271 (2007); Richard E. Speidel, Parties’ Power to Vary Standards for Review of Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 314 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); Maureen A.
Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion and
Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385 (2007).
10 For discussion of this issue, see William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator’s Jurisdic-
tion:  Timing and Finality in American Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135 (2007); Alan Scott Rau, Fed-
eral Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J.
107 (2007).
11 For example, opponents of mandatory arbitration would typically prefer that judges,
rather than arbitrators, decide whether an arbitration clause is valid.  Such opponents fear
that arbitrators might, at least unconsciously, be influenced by their eagerness to hear an
arbitration and thus refuse to find the clause invalid. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
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Although academics have spent a great deal of time and pages bashing the
Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, they have
devoted far less energy to the more positive mission of trying to reform the
statute, assuming reform is needed.  In an attempt to take some positive steps
towards reform, co-authors Edward Brunet, Richard Speidel, Stephen Ware,
and I decided to write a book discussing what if any reforms of the FAA are
needed.12  While we did not agree amongst ourselves as to what reforms were
needed,13 we all found that the process of thinking through possible legislative
reform, and debating it amongst ourselves, was very rewarding.
This Symposium is an outgrowth of the book project.  As Director of the
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, I have the luxury of being able to host
conferences related to the topic of conflict resolution.  I decided to invite some
of the best-known and respected arbitration scholars in the country to come to
Las Vegas and opine on how if at all the Federal Arbitration Act should be
revised.  To my delight (and a bit of shock), every single invitation I extended
was accepted, and this terrific group of articles is the result.14
Those of us who participated in the Symposium know that it was a great
deal of fun.15  But, I believe I speak for the entire group of scholars when I say
that we fervently hope that this Symposium will prove to be valuable not only
to us, but to policy makers as well.  The potential for reform of the Federal
Arbitration Act is real.  For example, on July 12, 2007, the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007 was introduced before both the House and Senate.16  This bill, if
passed, would amend the FAA to prohibit the use of mandatory arbitration with
respect to consumers, employees, or franchisees.17  Similarly, on June 12,
2007, the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law for the House
Judiciary Committee held a hearing on whether mandatory binding arbitration
REV. 1, 24 (1997) (“[A]rbitrators are even less likely to void purported arbitration agree-
ments than are courts.”).  The question of whether arbitrators or instead courts should make
these rulings has led to a split among federal courts of appeal. Compare Alexander v.
Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003), with Hawkins v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans,
338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003).
12 EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBI-
TRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006).
13 Indeed, Chapter 7 of the book contends a colloquy on some of our disagreements.
14 Following the dream metaphor, I was reminded a bit of the famous line from the movie
Field of Dreams (Gordon Co. 1989), albeit alluding to a baseball diamond:  “If you build it,
he will come.”  Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097351/quotes (last
visited Oct. 20, 2007).  We created the conference and the experts came to Las Vegas.
15 We are, after all, a bunch of arbitration nerds.
16 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
17 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, § 4.  Note that Congress has already
passed legislation proscribing the use of mandatory arbitration with respect to automobile
franchisees and prohibited payday lenders form imposing arbitration on military personnel.
The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 was signed into law
as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (2002).  As part of a Department of Defense
authorization bill, Pub. L. No. 109-364, it is “unlawful for any creditor to extend consumer
credit to a covered member or a dependent of such member with respect to which . . . the
creditor requires the borrower to submit to arbitration or imposes onerous legal notice provi-
sions in the case of a dispute.”  10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2000).
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agreements are fair to consumers.18  Thus, it is clear that there is interest, in
Congress, in considering potential reform of the FAA.19
In organizing the Symposium, I basically asked each invitee to write about
whatever aspect of FAA potential reform they found most compelling.  Yet,
notwithstanding this libertarian approach, the panelists’ remarks divided them-
selves fairly neatly into five panels, as discussed below.
Participants in the first panel all examine the question of whether and
when agreements to arbitrate ought to be enforceable.  Professor Richard Bales
and co-author Christopher Kippley present an argument regarding the type of
consent that ought to be required before pre-dispute arbitration agreements
would be enforceable with respect to consumers and employees.20  They urge
that just as workers are protected, by statute, from waiving their rights to bene-
fits, so too should all consumers and employees be protected from agreeing,
unwittingly, to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration rather than
through litigation.  Next, Professor Amy Schmitz also examines the dangers of
enforcing small-print contracts of adhesion mandating arbitration.21  However,
rather than urging the outright ban of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the con-
sumer and employment settings, she instead suggests that Congress impose
minimum standards of fairness with respect to such clauses.  Then Professor
Michael Green examines the question of what if any steps Congress might take
to encourage post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.22  Green asserts that if oppo-
nents to mandatory employment arbitration are successful in banning pre-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate employment disputes, it is critically important
simultaneously to find means to encourage post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.
Otherwise, urges Green, the many potential benefits of arbitration over litiga-
tion for both employees and employers will be lost.23  Finally, as the last par-
ticipant in the first panel, I seek to turn matters a bit on their head.  As a
longtime opponent of the imposition of mandatory arbitration on “little guys,” I
18 Hearing on the “Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements:  Are They Fair for Con-
sumers?” Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).  Testimony was provided by F. Paul Bland, Jr., a Staff
Attorney for Public Justice, who has litigated many cases seeking to invalidate mandatory
arbitration provisions; David S. Schwartz, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law
School who has written multiple articles opposing mandatory arbitration; Mark J. Levin, an
attorney at a large firm who regularly defends his lender clients’ use of mandatory arbitra-
tion; and Jordan Fogal, a senior citizen who was required to bring her claims against her
home builder in arbitration and believes she received highly unfair treatment.
19 Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the preemptive scope of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act very broadly, state legislatures have quite limited power to reform arbitration prac-
tices.  For discussion of preemption issues, see Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of
Federalism and State Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326 (2007).
20 Christopher J. Kippley & Richard A. Bales, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent Pro-
tections to Arbitration Agreements Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J. 10
(2007).
21 Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37
(2007).
22 Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to
Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58 (2007).
23 Id. at 60.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ101.txt unknown Seq: 5 24-JAN-08 14:40
Fall 2007] INTRODUCTION 5
have frequently urged Congress, states, or courts to ban the practice.24  In this
presentation, for a change of pace, I decided to defend the practice of
mandatory arbitration but only if imposed on the company, rather than on the
little guy.25  From both a policy and a constitutional perspective, I consider
why it might be acceptable for Congress to impose arbitration on companies,
even if it is not acceptable in my view for private companies to impose arbitra-
tion on little guys.
The second panel of the Symposium focuses on issues pertaining to how
responsibilities and legal issues should be divided between arbitrators and
courts.  As the commentators recognize, these issues of “separability” and juris-
diction are often seen as the most complex in arbitration.  In Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,26 the Supreme Court explained that
arbitration clauses and the contracts in which they are contained are “separa-
ble,” and that arbitrators rather than courts should typically determine the valid-
ity of the container contract.  Professor Stephen Ware, first, focuses on the
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this morass: Buckeye Check Cashing
Inc. v. Cardegna.27  Considering how Buckeye might be reconciled with such
prior Supreme Court decisions as Prima Paint,28 First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan,29 and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,30 Ware boldly calls
for a repeal of the separability doctrine in order to better honor parties’ contrac-
tual intentions.31  Professor William Park, next, addresses doctrines of separa-
bility and jurisdiction from the perspective of one deeply versed in international
as well as domestic arbitration.  Showing that the Supreme Court’s approach is
closely analogous to the way other countries have approached these jurisdic-
tional issues, Park concludes:  “While not entirely free from doubt, the Ameri-
can cases are probably getting things more right than wrong.”32  Finally
Professor Alan Rau provides his rationale for why the Federal Arbitration Act
24 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1674-75 (2005) (asserting privately imposed mandatory arbitration is “unjust”);
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 99-100 (calling upon courts to recognize that mandatory arbitra-
tion is often unconstitutional); Sternlight, supra note 4, at 712 (urging that if the Supreme
Court does not revise its arbitration jurisprudence, Congress should either bar mandatory
arbitration or allow state legislatures to pass protective legislation).  I therefore enthusiasti-
cally support the recently introduced Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007.
25 Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration (if Imposed on the Company), 8
NEV. L.J. 82 (2007).
26 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg, 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
27 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding that challenge
asserting contract as a whole is void as a matter of public policy must be heard by arbitrator
rather than by court, while recognizing that challenges to arbitration clause in particular shall
be heard by courts).
28 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395.
29 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (holding that court, rather
than arbitrator, must rule on question of whether container agreement was ever formed).
30 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002) (reiterating that courts
rather than arbitrators should decide “gateway” disputes as to whether arbitration clause
applies to a particular dispute, while holding that arbitrator should decide timeliness of claim
brought in arbitration).
31 Ware, supra note 10.
32 Park, supra note 10, at 168.
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should not be revised with respect to separability (or any other matter).33  As to
separability, Rau has previously explained that while the doctrine is often mis-
understood, he for one finds it “unproblematical.”34  Defending that notion as
well as courts’ generally superior abilities as compared to legislators, Rau col-
orfully proclaims:  “The power of Congress over the practice of arbitration
should, I think, be precisely equivalent to that of the Czar over the far-flung
peasant villages of Russia—absolute, but exercised at an inconceivably remote
distance.”35
The third panel focuses on the terms under which courts should be able to
vacate arbitral awards.  Several of the panelists favor amending the FAA to
allow for more expansive review than currently permitted by section 10 of the
Act, although they differ substantially on the specifics.  For example Professor
Sarah Cole, espousing the virtues of freedom of contract, urges that the FAA be
amended to “permit parties to agree to expanded judicial review, so long as the
court’s review of the award does not compromise the institutional integrity of
the courts.”36  Professor Christopher Drahozal focuses on “manifest disregard”
as a basis for vacating arbitral awards, rather than on contractual expansions of
section 10.37  As Drahozal notes, although courts generally allow arbitral
awards to be vacated due to their manifest disregard of the law, this doctrine
lacks good support as a matter of either doctrine or case law.38  He advocates
that the doctrine ought to be codified to support the integrity of the court sys-
tem.39  Professor Jeffrey Stempel focuses on the implications of mandatory or
“mass” arbitration for determination of an appropriate vacatur standard.40  As a
prudential matter, Stempel urges that opponents of mandatory arbitration are
better off seeking an improved vacatur standard, which would help ensure that
arbitrators apply the law, than opposing the enforcement of mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions altogether.41
However, not all the presenters favor the use of expanded review.  Profes-
sor Richard Reuben instead states:  “[T]he displacement of finality with sub-
stantive judicial review, if codified, will greatly undermine the arbitration
process, its attractiveness as an alternative to public adjudication or negotiated
settlement, and its utility as an aid to the judiciary as a forum for the expedi-
tious resolution of disputes.”42  Thus, Reuben urges that “[r]ather than requir-
ing or permitting substantive judicial review . . . the FAA should maintain its
33 Rau, supra note 10, at 169 (“[I]t would be far better if we were to leave the FAA com-
pletely alone.”).
34 Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen
Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3 (2003).
35 Rau, supra note 10, at 169.
36 Cole, supra note 9, at 214.
37 Drahozal, supra note 9.
38 No language in the FAA supports the use of “manifest disregard” review, and the
Supreme Court has only supported the doctrine in dictum.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
436 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
39 Drahozal, supra note 9, at 235.
40 Stempel, supra note 9, at 251.
41 Id.
42 Reuben, supra note 9, at 272.
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current narrow grounds for substantive review and be amended to resolve a
split in the lower courts, to make clear that parties cannot contract for substan-
tive judicial review . . . .”43
Finally, switching gears to consider the international context, Professor
Richard Speidel considers how contractually expanded review, such as that dis-
cussed by Professor Cole,44 might be treated in an international contract.45
Speidel is concerned with the potential for lack of parity between the treatment
afforded to domestic and foreign arbitral awards.  He urges that it ought not to
be permissible, in the international setting, to expand the scope of review
beyond that permitted by treaty, and that the relevant laws ought to be revised
to ensure that result.46
The fourth panel focuses on multi-jurisdictional issues brought into play
by the Federal Arbitration Act and its interpretation.  Professor Edward Brunet
discusses what he sees as the anomalous fact that “federal law has been permit-
ted to run roughshod over the subtleties of state efforts to regulate aspects of
arbitration.”47  One might have expected that states rather than the federal gov-
ernment would play a major role in regulating arbitration, says Brunet, given
that contractual and consumer matters are typically left to states’ police powers,
given that states are typically allowed to provide their own procedural rules,
and given the Supreme Court’s current supposed devotion to federalism val-
ues.48  To correct this situation, Brunet urges that the FAA be amended to spec-
ify no intent to preempt the field of arbitration regulation.49  Turning, then to
the international setting, Professor Catherine Rogers considers how the arrival
of “have-nots” into the world of international arbitration will and should affect
the nature of arbitration that crosses international boundaries.50  Specifically,
whereas international arbitration has traditionally been premised on the suppo-
sition that two sophisticated parties with relatively equal bargaining power vol-
untarily agreed to arbitrate rather than litigate their disputes, Rogers explains
that globalization and increased reliance on the Internet have now brought both
consumers and employees into the world of international arbitration.  Looking
at the effect these new arrivals may have on the system of international arbitra-
tion, Rogers concludes that such arbitration has the potential to “operate as an
instrument for . . . mediating conflicting national laws and policies, for securing
effective transnational regulation, and for generating international public policy
norms.”51  She believes that other countries’ protection of consumers and
employees from unfair processes may ensure that international arbitration
involving “have-nots” will be fairer than its domestic counterpart.52
43 Id.
44 See Cole, supra note 9.
45 Speidel, supra note 9.
46 Id. at 323-25.
47 Brunet, supra note 19, at 326.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 340.
50 Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8
NEV. L.J. 341 (2007).
51 Id. at 384.
52 Id. at 360.
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The fifth panel of the Symposium looks at the FAA through a wide-angle
lens, rather than focusing on particular narrow aspects that might be in need of
reform.  Professor Maureen Weston traces the history of the Act and argues that
whereas the Act was “[o]stensibly designed to provide for the voluntary private
adjudication of disputes, [it] generates thousands of lawsuits, is vociferously
challenged by consumer protection groups, widely criticized in scholarly arti-
cles, and is judicially determined to preempt and thus substantially restrict
states’ ability to enact legislation responsive to constituent concerns.”53  There-
fore, urges Weston, Congress ought to pass legislation that returns the FAA to
its roots by limiting its preemptive scope and either exempting consumer and
employment disputes altogether or, at minimum, providing extra protections for
consumers or employees who are contractually mandated to take claims to arbi-
tration.54  Next Professor David Schwartz, a long-time critic of the Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence,55 sounds similar themes when he contends
that “[w]e are nearing the quarter-century mark in the Supreme Court’s mis-
guided reinterpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act.”56  He targets the
Court’s decisions permitting the growth of mandatory arbitration and urges that
these decisions are bad not only because they support unfair policy,57 but also
because “the forcing of employment and consumer cases into the mandatory
arbitration system has created inexorable pressures to judicialize arbitration.”58
Thus, addressing himself to those who love arbitration as it was, Schwartz
urges that the FAA be amended to exempt consumer and employment disputes
from pre-dispute arbitration.59  Finally, Professor Thomas Stipanowich ends
the Symposium by examining how the law of binding arbitration is affecting
the law of other dispute resolution processes.60  Stipanowich explains that bind-
ing arbitration is no longer the main game in town, and that contracts are
increasingly calling for the use of other informal processes such as non-binding
arbitration and mediation.  Also, contracts increasingly include step-dispute
resolution clauses that anticipate the potential use of multiple processes.61  Yet,
courts are not quite sure how to handle these non-arbitration clauses and are
inconsistent as to whether they apply the Federal Arbitration Act to processes
other than binding arbitration.62  Stipanowich urges that “the burden generally
outweighs whatever benefits may be achieved by viewing ADR processes
53 Weston, supra note 9, at 386 (footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 398-99.
55 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 6; David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in
Statutory Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004).
56 David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free:  How “Mandatory” Undermines
“Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 400 (2007).
57 Schwartz does not present fairness arguments here, but rather alludes to his own and
others’ prior work. Id. at 401.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 422.
60 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra:  Arbitration Law and the Rapidly
Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427 (2007).
61 Such clauses might for example state that disputants need to attempt good faith negotia-
tion, but that if that fails they should then mediate, and that if mediation fails they should
resolve the dispute through binding arbitration.
62 Stipanowich, supra note 60, at 437.
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through the lens of arbitration law,” and instead suggests that courts needed to
be provided with other guidance, perhaps through a Restatement of Dispute
Resolution.63
Maybe it’s just “Nevada Dreamin’”64 but I truly hope that this conference,
and this Symposium issue, can help influence debate in this country regarding
arbitration.  Having brought together some of the best arbitration scholars in the
country, it would be a real shame if this conference was only a good time for us
and had no impact in the real world.
63 Id. at 463, 473.
64
“California Dreamin’” was first released by the Mamas and the Papas in 1965, and
Wikipedia reports that the song is #89 on Rolling Stone’s list of top 500 songs ever. THE
MAMAS AND THE PAPAS, California Dreamin’, on IF YOU CAN BELIEVE YOUR EYES AND
EARS (Dunhill 1966); Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Dreamin’ (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2007).  I hope it is not the impossible dream.  “The Impossible Dream” was a
song in the 1965 musical, Man of La Mancha. MITCH LEIGH, The Impossible Dream, in
MAN OF LA MANCHA (1965).  The lyrics are available at Reel Classics, http://www.reel
classics.com/Actors/O’Toole/impossibledream-lyrics.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
